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CyberArk, a privileged access control service provider, released a paper which is showing how hackers might exploit flaws in the CNI (Container Network Interface) used to connect Pods in Kubernetes.
As Clusters of Kubernetes are becoming more extensively deployed, fraudsters are leveraging several tried and proven tactics to breach CNI security, according to Nir Chako, security research team head at CyberArk.
Attackers with access to kubelet can gather information about the cluster, gain access to apps running inside the containers, and move around the cluster laterally until it is entirely compromised. With that knowledge, attackers can make a list of the cluster’s pods and execute instructions inside them.
CyberArk designed a client to make anonymous requests using a new open-source tool called “kubeletctl” that implements all of the kubelet APIs to demonstrate how to hack kubelet. The program scans for all open kubelet ports and is made available by CyberArk to assist cybersecurity teams in evaluating nodes.
If developers choose, they can use kubeletctl to interface directly with the kubelet API via kubeletctl. Without having to identify each pod and container separately, the kubeletctl utility allows you to run a command on all the pods inside the nodes. There was even a search option that allows you to find all of the tokens on the pod.
CNI plug-ins are being targeted with attack techniques like ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) DNS spoofing and poisoning. The assaults demonstrate that by manipulating networking characteristics in Kubernetes settings, it is feasible to circumvent several controls for cluster security in Kubernetes like iptables rules were utilized to configure a utility for Linux firewall and harden the node’s operating system.
These approaches, according to Chako, may be used to execute a DNS spoofing assault from a Kubernetes worker node’s pod. A DNS server is impersonated in this assault vector and sends false replies to DNS queries from the same worker node’s pod. According to him, cybercriminals can reroute the pod’s contacts with the target domain to a certain IP address.
Plugins of layer 2 networks are exclusively vulnerable by this attack vector, which implies that all pods on the node will be on the same subnet and are not separated by an Ethernet broadcast limiter. Attackers must utilize a spoofing attack of ARP on the targeted pod and on the cni0 bridge device to achieve a man-in-the-middle position in order to carry out these assaults.
This assault vector necessitates packet manipulation by the attacker. The NET_RAW ability can be removed from a program, preventing the assailant from exploiting raw sockets. The other method is to use iptables to configure a firewall that prevents responses from a pod’s DNS that isn’t a DNS server from being sent to some other pod.
The 2nd class of CNI plug-in attacks uses network overlays like VXLAN to get around security restrictions by removing the pod’s NET_RAW capabilities, adding a “reverse path filtering” to the pod’s device, and getting over a firewall policy on the network. This method makes use of a flaw in the capability to reach a server’s UDP port number 8472 from a pod. This vulnerability is mitigated by rules of iptables that prevent a pod from transmitting any packets to the cluster. The IT teams must be paying serious attention to their cluster rights for “list nodes.” Without being aware of the MAC address of the required VTEP (virtual tunnel endpoint), it would be far more difficult for an attacker to deliver these types of packets
Due to the packets flowing over these networks are often encrypted, these assaults, according to Chako, can be difficult to detect.
Providing the relative Kubernetes networking’s immaturity, Chako predicts that further Networking vulnerabilities in Kubernetes will surface in the coming months. These vulnerabilities might not be slowing down the adoption of Kubernetes, but they will undoubtedly create new hurdles to IT security professionals on a technology that many are only now learning about.
By reading this blog, you might have comprehended how attackers are gathering the information and how Kubernetes networks are prone to vulnerabilities. So the IT teams must adopt the necessary policies and procedures for ensuring the security of the infrastructure of Kubernetes.
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